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Abstract
Our study provides a survey on how existing stablecoins—cryptocurrencies aiming at price
stabilization—peg their value to other assets, from the perspective of Decentralized Pay-
ment Systems (DPSs). This attempt is important because there has been no preceding sur-
veys focusing on the stablecoin as DPSs, i.e., the one aiming at not only price stabilization
but also decentralization. Specifically, we first classified existing stablecoins into four types
according to their collaterals (fiat, commodity, crypto, and non-collateralized) and pointed
out the high potential of non-collateralized stablecoins as DPSs; then, we further classified
existing non-collateralized stablecoins into two types according to their intervention layers
(protocol, application) and confirmed details of their representative mechanisms. Utilizing
concepts such as Quantity Theory of Money (QTM), Tobin tax, and speculative attack, our
survey revealed the status quo where, despite the high potential of non-collateralized sta-
blecoins, they have no standard mechanism to achieve the stablecoin for practical DPSs.
Keywords: cryptocurrency, decentralized payment system, stablecoin, survey paper
1 Introduction
Since Nakamoto [1] first proposed their theoretical concept, a large variety of cryptocur-
rencies1 have been issued and actively traded online. After hitting a high of almost $20,000
for one bitcoin in December 2017 [5], the total market capitalization of cryptocurrencies
reached $796 billion [6]—equivalent to second place in the world ranking of companies by
market capitalization at that time, right after Apple Inc.s $911 billion [7].
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1The term cryptocurrency has a number of definitions, such as any form of currency that only exists digitally,
that usually has no central issuing or regulating authority but instead uses a decentralized system to record
transactions and manage the issuance of new units, and that relies on cryptography to prevent counterfeiting and
fraudulent transactions [2] and A medium of exchange that functions like money (in that it can be exchanged for
goods and services) but, unlike traditional currency, is untethered to, and independent from, national borders,
central banks, sovereigns, or fiats [3]. See Houben and Snyers [4] for other legal definitions, provided by policy
makers.
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Figure 1: A Classification Tree for Stablecoins
From the perspective of online payment systems, several studies [8][9] have focused on
the potential of cryptocurrencies as Decentralized Payment Systems (DPSs) that can pro-
vide various advantages, such as (i) the diffusion of control among stakeholders; (ii) the
ability to engage in trusted commerce without a centralized intermediary; (iii) the poten-
tial to disrupt the rents extracted by centralized intermediaries facilitating commerce; and
(iv) global consistency and transparency on a shared ledger [8]2. Despite these advantages,
however, cryptocurrencies are now difficult to work as practical DPSs due to their high
price volatility3. The high price volatility undermines the three functions of money (i.e.,
Medium-of-Exchange, Store-of-Value, Unit-of-Account), which results in less demand to
own cryptocurrency for online payments. In fact, according to an online survey in 2018
[14], the awareness of cryptocurrency is 74% on average in the eight largest cryptocur-
rency markets (US, UK, Germany, Brazil, Japan, South Korea, China and India), while its
ownership remains 7% on average.
Stablecoin is an approach to address this problem of high price volatility, which is for
example defined as a digital currency that is pegged to another stable asset like gold, or to
major fiat currencies like Euros, Pounds or the US dollar [15]4. Reflecting the necessity
for cryptocurrencies as practical DPSs, the market for stablecoin continues to grow rapidly,
more than doubling from $1.4 billion to $3 billion between 2018 and 2019 [18].
Our study aims to provide a survey on how such stablecoins peg their value to other
assets, from the perspective of DPSs. This attempt is important because, to the best of our
knowledge, there has been no preceding surveys that focuses on the stablecoin as DPSs,
i.e., the one aiming at not only price stabilization but also decentralization. Specifically, as
Figure 1 depicts, we first classify existing stablecoins into four types according to their col-
laterals (fiat, commodity, crypto, and non-collateralized)5 and point out the high potential of
non-collateralized stablecoins as DPSs; then, we further classify existing non-collateralized
stablecoins into two types according to their intervention layers (protocol, application) and
2DPSs develop a variety of protocols to address more specific topics, such as micro payments [10][11] and
transparent monetary policy [12].
3For specific data on the high price volatility, see, for example, Cryptocurrency Index 30 [13].
4Note that there are many other definitions for stablecoin, such as cryptocurrency that has price stable
characteristics [16] and a digital token that will have low price volatility as a result of being pegged to some
underlying fiat currency, thereby acting as a store of value, a medium of exchange and unit of accounting for
blockchain payments [17].
5This classification is based on the two preceding studies: Zhang et al. [19] and Mancini-Griffoli [20].
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confirm details of their representative mechanisms. In addition, to evaluate a variety of
stablecoins, the above process leverages three concepts in economics—Quantity Theory of
Money (QTM), Tobin tax, and speculative attack. Our survey consequently highlights the
status quo where, despite the high potential of non-collateralized stablecoins, they have no
standard mechanism to achieve both price stabilization and decentralization.
The remaining part of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 covers preliminaries,
which includes the introduction of the three useful concepts in economics and the four
collateral types to classify existing stablecoins. Section 3 provides an in-depth survey on
representative mechanisms in the non-collateralized stablecoin that would have the highest
potential as DPSs, by using the layer-based classification. Finally, Section 4 concludes our
survey with describing implications and our next steps.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we first introduce three concepts in economics (QTM, Tobin tax, and spec-
ulative attack) which are all useful when considering price-stabilization mechanisms em-
ployed in stablecoins. Moreover, we here classify existing stablecoins into four types ac-
cording to their collateral (fiat, commodity, crypto, and non-collateralized) and point out
that the non-collateralized is the best way to implement stablecoins as DPSs.
2.1 Quantity Theory of Money
QTM is a theory of economics that attempts to explain the price level in terms of the amount
of money in circulation. A representative model in QTM is the equation of exchange which
was formulated by Fisher [21][22] as follows:
M ·V = P ·Q, (1)
where M is the amount of money supply (in a given period), and V is the velocity of money;
P is the price level, and Q is an index of real expenditures on newly produced goods and
services. Namely, the left-hand side represents the scale of an economy through money in
circulation, while the right-hand side represents it through goods and services in circulation.
An implication of this equation is that we can adjust the price level P with M and V if their
change has no (or small) effect on Q (i.e., if money is neutral).
From the viewpoint of stablecoins, the QTM is important because it has been a basis
of the mechanisms for non-collateralized stablecoins. As we will confirm in Section 3, all
non-collateralized stablecoins attempt to stabilize its P by using some mechanism that au-
tomatically adjusts M or V in a decentralized manner6. Specifically, just as central banks
tighten monetary policy against inflation, the mechanism decreases M or V if P becomes too
high, and vice versa. Such mechanisms for automatic price adjustment have become more
feasible thanks to cryptocurrencies in which we can easily manage transaction records and
money supply; on the other hand, there are several related studies preceding cryptocurren-
cies, including the Tobin tax below.
6Note that this P denotes not the price of the stablecoin measured by other currency (e.g., USD) but the
price of goods and services measured by the stablecoin. Accordingly, the higher P means the lower value of
the stablecoin (i.e., inflation).
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2.2 Tobin Tax
Tobin tax is a proposal by Tobin [23][24] in 1972, which aims to stabilize the currency
exchange rate by penalizing short-term speculative (noise) trading7. Specifically, it is a
small amount (e.g., 0.5%) of tax imposed on international financial transactions to throw
some sand in the wheels of our excessively efficient international money markets [24]8.
A variety of studies have analyzed the Tobin tax. For example, McCulloch and Pacillo
[25] surveyed related literature and available empirical evidence, then concluded that the
Tobin tax can be a major source of revenue without causing market distortions while it may
not contribute to the stabilization of exchange rate. To cover its weak contribution to the
stabilization, Spahn [26] extended the Tobin tax to the two-tier rate structure (Spahn tax)
that imposes a higher tax when financial transactions are taken place outside a predeter-
mined range of exchange rate. Furthermore, Liuzzi et al. [27] leveraged an artificial market
to find the optimal rate of the Tobin tax. Their simulation derived the result close to Spahn
[26]: a non-negligible level of taxation for highly liquid markets and low (close to zero)
levels of taxation for low liquidity markets.
From the viewpoint of stablecoins, the Tobin tax is important because it has been one of
the common tools for existing non-collateralized stablecoins. As we will confirm in Section
3, several non-collateralized stablecoins adopt the mechanisms which adjust M and V by
imposing some amount of fee on each transaction. Namely, non-collateralized stablecoins
inherit the concept of Tobin tax—throw some sand in the wheels of our excessively efficient
international money markets [24]. In addition, although there are few preceding studies, the
Tobin tax should also have implications for collateralized stablecoins, as they have a risk of
speculative attack which we will discuss below.
2.3 Speculative Attack
Speculative attack is an action that inactive speculators suddenly sell a large amount of
currency to deplete the government’s reserves, thereby making the pegged exchange rate
fail. Speculators have an incentive to do this attack because they can make big profits from
short selling, etc. when the (previously maintained) pegged exchange rate fails.
A variety of studies have analyzed how speculative attacks occur. For example, Krug-
man [28] was the first study to model the speculative attack targeting a government with
insufficient reserves in the foreign exchange market, by extending Salant and Henderson
[29]. On the other hand, subsequent studies, such as Obstfeld [30][31] and Chang and Ve-
lasco [32], pointed out that speculative attacks (resulting in currency crisis) may occur even
in a government with sufficient reserves, by taking into account self-fulfilling features in
which a speculator actually sells the currency if she predicts that other speculators may sell
the currency9.
From the viewpoint of stablecoins, the speculative attack is important because it has
been a main risk for existing stablecoins. Collateralized stablecoins would likely to be
subject to speculative attacks, as they have a similar structure to the pegged currencies
relying on government reserves. Despite this potential risk, to the best of our knowledge,
Routledge and Zetlin-Jones [34] is the only preceding study that addresses the speculative
7Tobin first proposed this idea at a lecture held in 1972, while the proceedings of which [23] were compiled
in later years.
8The Tobin tax and its extensions are often referred to as Currency Transaction Taxes (CTTs) or Financial
Transaction Taxes (FTTs).
9See also Diamond and Divig [33] which is the first study to model self-fulfillment in bank runs.
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attack in collateralized stablecoins. Non-collateralized stablecoins would also be subject
to the attack, as speculators can profit from their high price volatility or peg failures in a
similar way10. Thus, as long as stablecoins are (by definition) pegged to other stable assets,
we must prevent their mechanisms from speculative attacks.
2.4 Fiat-, Commodity-, Crypto-, and Non-Collateralized Stablecoins
Based on preceding studies [19][20], this section classifies existing stablecoins into four
types according to their collaterals (Figure 1). In addition, for each type, we briefly explain
its mechanism and problem as DPSs, which are summarized in Table 1.
The first type is a fiat-collateralized stablecoin which uses fiat money (e.g., the US
dollar) as collateral. Specifically, it employs a simple and intuitive mechanism that issues
new stablecoin on condition that the asset to be pegged is collateralized and, like the gold
standard, commits to exchange the stablecoin for collateral at a fixed rate at any time. A
representative example of this type is Tether [36]—a stablecoin which is promised a one-
to-one exchange with the US dollar. Despite this simplicity, however, the fiat-collateralized
stablecoin has a problem of requiring a centralized custodian to manage deposited collateral
and issue new stablecoins. This is contrary to the aforementioned advantage of DPSs: the
ability to engage in trusted commerce without a centralized intermediary” [8]. Accordingly,
we cannot use the fiat-collateralized stablecoin as DPSs due to the lack of decentralization.
The second type is a commodity-collateralized stablecoin which uses commodity (e.g.,
gold, oil) as collateral. Although this type uses different collaterals, it actually employs
the same mechanism as the fiat-collateralized stablecoin and thus shares the problem, too.
Representative examples of this type are DigixDAO [37] and Petro [38]—the stablecoins
which are pegged to (and collateralized by) gold in the former and oil in the latter. Needless
to say, we cannot use the commodity-collateralized stablecoin as DPSs due to the same
problem: the lack of decentralization.
The third type is a crypto-collateralized stablecoin which uses cryptocurrency (e.g.,
bitcoin) as collateral. To address the lack of decentralization, it employs a mechanism that
uses cryptocurrency (with a decentralized consensus algorithm) for pegging the stablecoin
to another stable asset (e.g., the US dollar), which allows any anonymous participants to
become a custodian11. A representative example of this type is Dai stablecoin [43]—a sta-
blecoin pegged to the US dollar but collateralized by the cryptocurrency Ethereum [44][45].
On the other hand, the crypto-collateralized stablecoin has another problem that the mecha-
nism, consisting of at least three assets (stablecoin, cryptocurrency as collateral, the asset to
be pegged), is inevitably complicated. In particular, to prevent the speculative attack while
using cryptocurrencies with high price volatility, the mechanism needs much greater collat-
erals than the value of newly issued stablecoin, which is a well-known over-collateralized
problem12. Thus, we cannot use the crypto-collateralized stablecoin as DPSs unless we
develop some simpler mechanism without the over-collateralized problem13.
10Even the Bitcoin protocol has a similar risk, called goldfinger attack [35] in which miners, even though
they have received bitcoin as a reward, damage its value in order to make profits from short selling or holding
alternative assets.
11Recently, crypto-collateralized stablecoin develops another category referred to as multi-collateralized sta-
blecoin which uses a variety of assets simultaneously as collateral (e.g., using gold, bitcoin, and Japanese yen
for pegging the stablecoin to the US dollar). For example, see Libra [39][40] and Synthetix [41][42]
12For example, the issuance of new Dai stablecoin requires at least 150% collateral (by default).
13Although it is not the main scope of this paper, crypto-collateralized stablecoins have recently developed
new mechanisms to avoid the over-collateralized problem, such as Lien protocol [46].
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Table 1: Characteristics of the Four Collateral Types
Collateralized by Decentralization Simplicity
Fiat currency [36] 7
Commodity [37][38] 7
Cryptocurrency [43] 7
None [47][48] 7 7
The fourth type is a non-collateralized stablecoin which does not use anything as col-
lateral. As mentioned above, it employs the mechanism that aims to stabilize P by auto-
matically adjusting M and V in a decentralized manner. If such a simple and decentralized
mechanism were feasible, the non-collateralized stablecoin could obtain the highest po-
tential as DPSs among the four types. However, can we really design the mechanism of
automatic adjustment, even under a variety of risk including the speculative attack? To
confirm the feasibility, we in Section 3 provide an in-depth survey on non-collateralized
stablecoins, which includes the introduction of representative examples [47][48].
In this section, we have introduced the three concepts and the four collateral types as
preliminaries. To summarize, the former implies the importance of preceding discussions in
economics to consider price-stabilization mechanisms for exisitng stablecoins, and the latter
implies the high potential of non-collaterized stablecoins as DPSs. Table 1 represents char-
acteristics of the four collateral types, which reflects (i) fiat- and commodity-collateralized
stablecoins are not decentralized because they require some centralized custodian to manage
collaterals; (ii) crypto-collateralized stablecoin is not simple because it consists of at least
three assets (stablecoin, cryptocurrency as collateral, and the asset to be pegged). Based on
this result, Section 3 focuses on the survey of non-collateralized mechanisms.
3 Non-Collateralized Mechanisms: A Survey
This section provides an in-depth survey on non-collateralized mechanisms, by using the
classification according to their two intervention layers: protocol and application (Figure
1). We here assume that the protocol is a layer related to fundamental consensus-algorithms
for the blockchain (e.g., Proof-of-Work algorithm and Nakamoto consensus in the Bitcoin
protocol), while the application is a layer not related to the consensus-algorithm but for
various systems running on the protocol14. Such layer-based classification became popu-
lar, especially after the Ethereum—an alternative protocol subsequent to the Bitcoin pro-
tocol—enabled application development on blockchains15. To the best of our knowledge,
non-collateralized stablecoins need to intervene in either protocol or application layers.
14See also the following other definitions: ”Protocol layer: consists of the core software building blocks that
make up a distributed ledger” [49]; ”Application layer: consists of all applications that are built on existing
distributed ledger networks” [49]. ”The protocol layer lays the foundational structure of the blockchain. It
determines the computing language the blockchain will be coded in and any computational rules that will
be used on the blockchain” [50]; ”The application layer is where networks and protocol are used to build
applications that users interact with” [50].
15Applications developed on Ethereum are often referred to as Decentralized Applications (DApps) [51].
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Specifically, for protocol and application layers, we confirm their representative mecha-
nisms from the perspective of both proposal and implementation, where the former is based
on academic articles and the latter is based on white papers for some project.
3.1 Stabilization by Protocol Layer
The survey for protocol layer first confirms two studies, Saito and Iwamura [52]16 and Saleh
[54], which both propose modified consensus-algorithms in order for the price stabilization
of cryptocurrencies17. Subsequently, as a representative implementation, we also confirm
the USDX project [47] which aims to issue stablecoins pegged with the US dollar.
3.1.1 Proposal
Studies on the protocol for price stabilization have mainly focused on the consensus al-
gorithm which underlies blockchain-based systems. For example, Saito and Iwamura [52]
proposes three modifications to Proof-of-Work algorithm in the current Bitcoin protocol18,
aiming for the stable price P through autonomous adjustment of the money supply M and
the velocity of money V . The first modification limits the re-adjustment of mining diffi-
culty (i.e., Proof-of-Work targets) only when the block-interval exceeds a certain threshold
value19. The second modification makes the amount of mining rewards variable according
to each scale of the aforementioned re-adjustment, instead of the existing halving rule20.
These two modifications are intended to adjust the growth rate of M (as mining reward) in
line with the fluctuating demand (as hash rate). The third modification imposes a negative
interest rate on all bitcoins, which increases in proportion to the time that elapses from the
bitcoin issuance just as assets are depreciated over time. This modification not only re-
strains the ever-increasing M but also intervenes in V because, like the Tobin tax, it collects
the negative interest for every transaction2122. Saito and Iwamura [52] tried to make the
Bitcoin protocol a practical DPS by the combination of these three modifications.
While Saito and Iwamura [52] proposed a modified Proof-of-Work algorithm, Saleh
[54] proposed an alternative algorithm for price stability. He first analyzed Proof-of-Work
by the overlapping-generations model [55]—a framework used in economics—and pointed
out that it can cause exceptional price volatility and welfare impairment. To solve the
problem, Saleh [54] recommends us to adopt Proof-of-Burn algorithm23 in which, to create
new blocks, miners need to send a certain amount of their coins to an unspendable (locked)
16See also Iwamura et al. [53].
17Note that these studies updating the Bitcoin protocol do not apply to stablecoin in the definition by Lund
[15], as they do not envision pegging their value to another asset. However, they are stablecoins in the definition
by Tomaino [16] which simply defines stablecoin as cryptocurrency that has price stable characteristics” [16].
18Strictly speaking, while their proposal is based on the Bitcoin protocol, it scopes blockchain-based cryp-
tocurrencies in general.
19Regardless of the block-interval, the current Bitcoin protocol re-adjust the mining difficulty for every 2,016
blocks.
20Regardless of the scale of re-adjustment, the current Bitcoin protocol halves the amount of its mining
reward for every 210,000 blocks.
21Unlike transaction fees in the current Bitcoin protocol, all bitcoins collected as negative interests will be
burned.
22Tobin tax and this negative interest are different in that the former fixes its own rate while the latter varies
its rate depending on time. The ever-increasing negative interest would also have a positive effect on V because
it encourages us to change old coin to new one.
23Note that, prior to Saleh [54], Stewart [56] for the first time proposed the concept of Proof-of-Burn in 2012.
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address. Here, the Proof-of-Burn adjusts mining difficulty through the amount of coins that
should be burned; in other words, his proposal controls M by adjusting the amount of coins
burned as mining costs, against the amount of newly issued coins as mining rewards.
One of the problems with these protocols is that their price stabilization does not use
market price (e.g., BTC/USD) directly, but uses mining difficulty as a proxy variable. It is
still controversial whether the mining difficulty (or hash rate in the case of Bitcoin proto-
col) can be a proxy variable for market prices [57][58]; however, at least on a yearly basis,
there seems to be no explicit correlation between the two [59]. In any case, these protocols
can no longer stabilize prices under a chronic deviation between market prices and mining
difficulty (i.e., unstable proxy variable). Accordingly, in 3.1.2, we introduce an implemen-
tation of the non-collateralized and protocol-based stablecoin, which aims to peg their price
directly with the US dollar.
3.1.2 Implementation
Tiutiun et al. [47] proposed the USDX—a project for non-collateralized stablecoin based
on the protocol layer. Specifically, this project has issued a stablecoin called USDY24,
which aims to maintain the same price with the US dollar through the following three
mechanisms. The first mechanism is variable block reward [47] to adjust the amount of
mining rewards, just as the second modification in Saito and Iwamura [52]. On the other
hand, to adjust mining rewards, the USDX leverages the USDY/USD price index25, rather
than the mining difficulty. That is, when USDY/USD > 1, the amount of mining rewards
(USDY) increases in order for the price reduction (by increasing the growth rate of M), and
vice versa. The second mechanism is lock-in mining [47] which is a kind of emergency
measure, activated only when the state of USDY/USD < 1 persists even if the variable
block reward takes the lowest value. To further reduce the money supply M, the lock-in
mining allows users to (stochastically) create a new block by temporary locking their own
USDY for a predetermined period which varies according to the rigidity of USDY/USD
< 126. When users successfully create new blocks with the lock-in mining, they can receive
mining rewards (USDY) independent of the variable block reward. The third mechanism
is variable transaction fee [47], which is the same with the third modification in Saito and
Iwamura [52] in that it burns circulating coin with a variable rate to control M and V . On
the other hand, the USDX also leverages the USDY/USD price index to determine the rate
of transaction fee, rather than the time from the coin issuance. That is, when USDY/USD
> 1, the amount of transaction fee decreases in order for the price reduction (by increasing
both M and V ), and vice versa. The USDX project aims to peg its stablecoin USDY with
the US dollar by the combination of the three mechanisms above.
The problem with the USDX is that its mechanism leads to the unstable purchasing
power (i.e., the amount of USDY · the current price of USDY) in each wallet. While
stablecoin, by definition, focuses on stabilizing its price against other assets, it needs to
stabilize the purchasing power of users as well in order to be a practical DPS satisfying
the store-of-value. In the case of USDX, the variable block reward and the lock-in mining
24This project contains two coins: USDX and USDY, where the former is a type of governance token and
the latter is stablecoin pegged to the US dollar.
25Here, we have another important problem: how to obtain data outside the blockchain (e.g., the USDY/USD
price index) in a decentralized manner while ensuring their reliability? In the context of blockchain, this is often
referred to as the Oracle problem [60]. Specifically, although we will spare you the details, the USDX employs
an original mechanism called the decentralized Schelling point Oracle system.
26Unlike the Proof-of-Burn, the locked USDY will back to the holders after the predetermined period.
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intervene only in the purchasing power of miners who voluntarily join the mechanisms;
however, the variable transaction fee intervenes in that of individuals who do nothing but
hold USDY. Furthermore, although the Tobin tax and negative interest rate in Saito and
Iwamura [52] do the same type of intervention, the variable transaction fee in USDX would
be worse because its fee rate fluctuates unpredictably (according to USDY/USD). Thus,
to enable a constant purchasing power, we should controll M and V through mechanisms
based on some voluntary action (e.g., mining), and if it were inevitable to use transaction
fees, the rates should at least be predictable.
3.2 Stabilization by Application Layer
The survey for application layer, on the other hand, first confirms three studies, Ametrano
[61], Morini [62], and Sams [63]. Even though Ametrano [61] and Morini [62] assume
direct intervention in each wallet, Sams [63] inherits these studies and proposes another
mechanism—Seigniorage Share. Subsequently, we also confirm the detail of the Basis
project [48] as a representative implementation of the Seigniorage Share.
3.2.1 Proposal
Discussions on the application for price stabilization stem from Ametrano [61], which
proposed a non-collateralized stablecoin named Hayek Money27. The gist of the Hayek
money is its rebasement mechanism [61] that automatically adjusts M by modifying (not
consensus-algorithm but) the amount of money stocked in each wallet, according to the data
on current price which is updated whenever miners create new blocks. However, as with
the USDX project, this simple mechanism leads to the unstable purchasing power because
the rebasement directly modifies the amount of money in each wallet.
To address this problem, Morini [62] argued that the Hayek money should divide its
wallet into two types: Inv wallets for investment and Sav wallets for saving. Here, in order
to leave the option of stable purchasing power, the rebasement only intervenes in the Inv
wallets (accordingly, M in Inv wallets is subject to the higher fluctuation than the original
Hayek money, to cover the adjustment for M in Sav wallets). Namely, Morini [62] allows
users to allocate their holding money into both Inv and Sav wallets, thereby offering the
freedom to choose how much they want to be affected by changes of money supply [62]
along with their risk appetite. This mechanism appears to be effective as it only intervenes
in the money whose owners have accepted the unstable purchasing power; however, it has
another problem. Consider the case where most users predict an increasing trend of P (i.e.,
a decline in the price of Hayek money). In this case, decreasing M for price-stabilization
becomes difficult because speculators would transfer their money from the Inv wallet to
the Sav wallet in order to avoid the rebasement. To make matters worse, this Inv-to-Sav
transfer will impose the higher decreasing rate on the Inv wallets, which further accelerates
the Inv-to-Sav transfer. Therefore, if speculators could freely transfer their money between
Inv-Sav wallets (i.e., the Inv/Sav ratio is unstable), it would be difficult to adjust (especially
to reduce) M in the Inv wallet28.
27It was named after the denationalization of money [64]—the concept proposed by Hayek.
28In response to the problem, Morini [62] suggests collecting a small amount of fee from Sav wallets to
decrease M, only if there are extremely few money in Inv wallets. However, this is contrary to the original
purpose of stabilizing the purchasing power in Sav wallets.
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Inhereting the above discussion, Sams [63] proposed a new mechanism for the price
stabilization in application layer, named Seigniorage Share. As the name implies, the mech-
anism aims to automatically adjust M through shares with which users can purchase sta-
blecoins. Specifically, when the mechanism detects an increasing trend of P29, it issues
new shares to decrease the current M. Shares are distributed among bidders who burned
an arbitrary amount of holding coins in a decentralized auction30. Conversely, when the
mechanism detects a decreasing trend of P, it issues new coins to increase the current M.
Coins are distributed among bidders who burned an arbitrary amount of holding shares in
another decentralized auction. In other words, Seigniorage Share is a mechanism that in-
tends for the price stabilization by letting users voluntarily balance the amount of coins and
shares, where, unlike the free transfer between Inv-Sav wallets, the coin-share exchange
rate is determined in auctions.
3.2.2 Implementation
Al-Naji et al. [48] proposed the Basis—a project for non-collateralized stablecoin based on
the application layer. Specifically, this project has issued a stablecoin called Basis token,
which aims to maintain the same rate with the US dollar through the Seigniorage Share. On
the other hand, to make the mechanism more practical, the Basis project has made some
modifications to the original Seigniorage Share [63]. One of the biggest modifications is to
adjust M with another token called bonds. Bonds are similar to shares in that they are newly
issued to reduce M and are distributed in a decentralized auction (where bonds are sold for
prices of less than 1 basis); however, they are not used to purchase stablecoins but, as with
real bonds, redeemed at a fixed exchange rate of Bond/Basis = 1 when the mechanism
newly issues the Basis token in the future. That is, the mechanism encourages users to
purchase the bond by the commitment to redeem it with the newly issued Basis token31.
This modification—using bonds instead of shares—is primarily for the robustness against
the case of high P (i.e., inflation). In the original Seigniorage Share [63], stablecoin would
be difficult to recover from extremely high P because the more new shares are supplied, the
lower their price and consequently the less power to reduce M. The Basis project attempts
to maintain this power to reduce M, by adopting bonds with the commitment to redeem at
a fixed exchange rate32.
However, regardless of this modification, the Basis project and the original Seigniorage
Share [63] both have a critical problem which is summarized as follows—incentives to buy
bonds are based on a circular dependency: people will buy the bonds if they think Basis
will climb up, but Basis will only climb up if people buy the bonds [65]. In other words,
there is a kind of tautology in the Seigniorage Share that requires a decrease of future P in
order to decrease current P (i.e., shares or bonds are in demand). It is highly doubtful that
29As with the Hayek money, Sams [63] assumes that the data on current price is updated whenever miners
create new blocks. Moreover, Sams [63] mentions the possibility of using mining difficulty as a proxy variable,
as in models for protocol layers, in addition to using general oracles that obtain price data from outside the
system (e.g., exchanges).
30See original article for the detail of decentralized auctions.
31It is confusing but the Basis project also uses shares which has a different role from those in Sams [63].
Shares in the Basis project are only issued at the genesis of the blockchain, and shareholders can receive the
newly issued Basis tokens, when the mechanism needs to increase M even after all bonds have been redeemed.
32In addition, the bonds in the Basis project will expire after five years, even if they are not redeemed with
the Basis tokens. This would help maintain the price of new bonds in terms of reducing the amount of existing
bonds.
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Table 2: Stabilization Mechanisms for Non-Collateralized Stablecoins
Intervention Layers QTM Problems
Protocol Application M V
Proposals
Proof-of-Work [52] 7 7 7 unstable proxy variable
Proof-of-Burn [54] 7 7 unstable proxy variable
Hayek Money [61] 7 7 unstable purchasing power
Inv/Sav wallets [62] 7 7 unstable Inv/Sav ratio
Seigniorage Share [63] 7 7 tautological mechanism
Implementations
USDX [47] 7 7 7 unstable purchasing power
Basis [48] 7 7 tautological mechanism
speculators would buy shares or bonds under such a tautological mechanism. Perhaps due
to this problem, the developer team announced the closure of Basis project in December
2018 [66], even though it raised $133 million through Initial Coin Offering (ICO).
In this section, we have surveyed non-collateralized mechanisms in protocol and appli-
cation layers, from the perspective of both proposal and implementation. To summarize,
as Table 2 shows, all existing non-collateralized stablecoins are not practical as DPSs due
to some problem. In the protocol layer, proposals [52][54] have the problem of unstable
proxy variable for market price, and even though an implementation [47] uses price data
outside the system, it has another problem of unstable purchasing power (of each wallet). In
the application layer, no mechanism has resolved this unstable purchasing power. Despite
proposals to increase the type of wallets [62] and tokens [63], speculators would not volun-
tarily contribute to the price stabilization. This is implied by the closure of a representative
project [48] for the application layer33.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we for the first time surveyed how existing stablecoins—cryptocurrencies
aiming at price stabilization—peg their value to other assets, from the perspective of DPSs.
Specifically, our survey first classified existing stablecoins into four types according to their
collaterals (fiat, commodity, crypto, and non-collateralized) and pointed out the high poten-
tial of non-collateralized stablecoins as DPSs (Table 1); then, it further classified existing
non-collateralized stablecoins into two types according to their intervention layers (proto-
col, application) and surveyed proposals and implementations for each layer (Table 2). This
survey focusing on non-collateralized stablecoins pointed out that, due to a variety of prob-
lems, all existing mechanisms cannot ensure the constant purchasing power in each wallet
which may be owned by speculators.
33Despite the closure, non-collateralized stablecoin still has a potential as a DPS and continues to develop
new mechanisms such as Terra [67]. Re-investigating the ever-increasing new proposals would be one of the
future works of this survey.
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This result implies the status quo where, despite the high potential of non-collateralized
stablecoins, they have no standard mechanism to achieve both price stabilization and de-
centralization. Accordingly, in order to make cryptocurrencies practical DPSs, our next
step would be to design some new non-collateralized mechanism that enables a constant
purchasing power, while taking into account the aforementioned concepts such as QTM,
Tobin tax, and speculative attack.
Acknowledgments
We would like to express our gratitude to B Cryptos for providing valuable comments and
financial support.
We also would like to express our gratitude to referees and participants in IIAI AAI 2019
for providing valuable comments.
References
[1] S. Nakamoto, “Bitcoin: A peer-to-peer electronic cash system,” 2008.
[2] C. Dictionary, “Definition of a cryptocurrency,” URL: https://www. merriam-webster.
com/dictionary/cryptocurrency, 2018.
[3] V. A. Maese, A. W. Avery, B. A. Naftalis, S. P. Wink, and Y. D. Valdez, “Cryptocur-
rency: A primer,” Banking LJ, vol. 133, p. 468, 2016.
[4] R. Houben and A. Snyers, Cryptocurrencies and blockchain: Legal context and im-
plications for financial crime, money laundering and tax evasion. 2018.
[5] CoinMarketCap, “Bitcoin charts.” https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/
bitcoin. [Accessed: 20-March-2019].
[6] CoinMarketCap, “Global charts.” https://coinmarketcap.com/charts. [Ac-
cessed: 20-March-2019].
[7] B. around the World, “The world’s top 50 companies.” https://www.relbanks.
com/rankings/worlds-largest-companies. [Accessed: 20-March-2019].
[8] F. Giulia and V. Pramod, eds., Decentralized Payment Systems: Principles and Design,
2019. http://pramodv.ece.illinois.edu/pubs/Decentralized-Payment-
Systems-Principles-and-Design.pdf, [Accessed: April-03-2019].
[9] R. Kaushal, “Bitcoin: First decentralized payment system,” International Journal Of
Engineering And Computer Science, vol. 5, no. 5, 2016.
[10] A. Xu, M. Li, X. Huang, N. Xue, J. Zhang, and Q. Sheng, “A blockchain based micro
payment system for smart devices,” Signature, vol. 256, no. 4936, p. 115, 2016.
[11] R. Pass and A. Shelat, “Micropayments for decentralized currencies,” in Proceedings
of the 22nd ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security,
CCS 15, (New York, NY, USA), p. 207218, Association for Computing Machinery,
2015.
Copyright c© by IIAI. Unauthorized reproduction of this article is prohibited.
60 M. Mita, K. Ito, S. Ohsawa, H. Tanaka
[12] G. Danezis and S. Meiklejohn, “Centrally banked cryptocurrencies,” Journal of Cryp-
tology, 2016.
[13] C. I. 30, “Cryptocurrency index 30: Cci30.” https://cci30.com/. [Accessed: 5-
May-2020].
[14] R. Jakubauskas, “How many people actually own cryptocurrency?.”
https://daliaresearch.com/blog/how-many-people-actually-own-
cryptocurrency/, May 2018. [Accessed: 20-March-2019].
[15] J. Lund, “Stable coins: Enabling payments on blockchain through alternative digital
currencies.” https://www.ibm.com/blogs/blockchain/2018/07/stable-
coins-enabling-payments-on-blockchain-through-alternative-
digital-currencies/, July 2018. [Accessed: 5-May-2020].
[16] N. Tomaino, “Stablecoins: A holy grail in digital currency.” https://thecontrol.
co/stablecoins-a-holy-grail-in-digital-currency-b64f3371e111,
April 2017. [Accessed: 5-May-2020].
[17] H. Hassani, X. Huang, and E. Silva, “Banking with blockchain-ed big data,” Journal
of Management Analytics, vol. 5, no. 4, pp. 256–275, 2018.
[18] G. Hileman, “State of stablecoins (2019),” Available at SSRN, 2019.
[19] A. R. Zhang, A. Raveenthiran, J. Mukai, R. Naeem, A. Dhuna, Z. Parveen, and H. M.
Kim, “The regulation paradox of initial coin offerings: A case study approach,” Fron-
tiers in Blockchain, vol. 2, p. 2, 2019.
[20] M. T. M. Griffoli, M. M. S. M. Peria, M. I. Agur, M. A. Ari, M. J. Kiff, M. A. Popescu,
and M. C. Rochon, Casting Light on Central Bank Digital Currencies. International
Monetary Fund, 2018.
[21] I. Fisher, “” the equation of exchange,” 1896-1910,” The American Economic Review,
vol. 1, no. 2, pp. 296–305, 1911.
[22] I. Fisher, The purchasing power of money: its’ determination and relation to credit
interest and crises. Cosimo, Inc., 2006.
[23] J. Tobin, “The new economy one decade older,” The Jane Lectures on Historical Eco-
nomics, 1974.
[24] J. Tobin, “A proposal for international monetary reform,” Eastern economic journal,
vol. 4, no. 3/4, pp. 153–159, 1978.
[25] N. McCulloch and G. Pacillo, “The tobin tax: a review of the evidence,” IDS Research
Reports, vol. 2011, no. 68, pp. 1–77, 2011.
[26] P. B. Spahn, “International financial flows and transactions taxes: survey and options,”
1995.
[27] D. Liuzzi, P. Pellizzari, and M. Tolotti, “Optimality of a two-tier rate structure for
a transaction tax in an artificial market,” in International Conference on Practical
Applications of Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, pp. 95–106, Springer, 2017.
Copyright c© by IIAI. Unauthorized reproduction of this article is prohibited.
IIAI Journal LATEX Template 61
[28] P. Krugman, “A model of balance-of-payments crises,” Journal of money, credit and
banking, vol. 11, no. 3, pp. 311–325, 1979.
[29] S. W. Salant and D. W. Henderson, “Market anticipations of government policies and
the price of gold,” Journal of political economy, vol. 86, no. 4, pp. 627–648, 1978.
[30] M. Obstfeld, “Rational and self-fulfilling balance-of-payments crises,” tech. rep., Na-
tional Bureau of Economic Research, 1984.
[31] M. Obstfeld, “Models of currency crises with self-fulfilling features,” European eco-
nomic review, vol. 40, no. 3-5, pp. 1037–1047, 1996.
[32] R. Chang and A. Velasco, “Financial crises in emerging markets,” tech. rep., National
Bureau of Economic Research, 1998.
[33] D. W. Diamond and P. H. Dybvig, “Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity,” Jour-
nal of political economy, vol. 91, no. 3, pp. 401–419, 1983.
[34] B. Routledge and A. Zetlin-Jones, “Currency stability using blockchain technology,”
tech. rep., Society for Economic Dynamics, 2018.
[35] J. A. Kroll, I. C. Davey, and E. W. Felten, “The economics of bitcoin mining, or bitcoin
in the presence of adversaries,” in Proceedings of WEIS, vol. 2013, p. 11, 2013.
[36] T. Limited, “Tether stable digital cash on the blockchain.” https://tether.to/,
2015. [Accessed: 27-May-2020].
[37] Digix, “Digix — the future of owning gold is digital.” https://digix.global/#/,
2014. [Accessed: 27-May-2020].
[38] G. of Venezuela, “El petro - sembrando la soberana tecnolgica.” https://www.
petro.gob.ve/, 2018. [Accessed: 27-May-2020].
[39] TheLibraAssociationMembers, “libra white paper.” https://libra.org/en-US/
white-paper/?noredirect=en-US, June 2019. [Accessed: 3-July-2019].
[40] Z. Amsden, R. Arora, S. Bano, M. Baudet, S. Blackshear, A. Bothra, G. Cabr-
era, C. Catalini, K. Chalkias, E. Cheng, et al., “The libra blockchain,” URl:
https://developers. libra. org/docs/assets/papers/the-libra-blockchain. pdf, 2019.
[41] S. Brooks, A. Jurisevic, M. Spain, and K. Warwick, “Havven: A decentralised pay-
ment network and stablecoin.” https://www.synthetix.io/uploads/havven_
whitepaper.pdf, June 2018. [Accessed: 30-April-2020].
[42] Synthetix.io, “Synthetix litepaper v1.4.” https://www.synthetix.io/uploads/
synthetix_litepaper.pdf, March 2020. [Accessed: 30-April-2020].
[43] MakerDAO, “The dai stablecoin system.” https://makerdao.com/en/
whitepaper/sai/, 2015. [Accessed: 27-May-2020].
[44] G. Wood et al., “Ethereum: A secure decentralised generalised transaction ledger,”
Ethereum project yellow paper, vol. 151, no. 2014, pp. 1–32, 2014.
Copyright c© by IIAI. Unauthorized reproduction of this article is prohibited.
62 M. Mita, K. Ito, S. Ohsawa, H. Tanaka
[45] V. Buterin et al., “Ethereum: A next-generation smart contract and decentralized ap-
plication platform,” URL https://github. com/ethereum/wiki/wiki/% 5BEnglish% 5D-
White-Paper, vol. 7, 2014.
[46] LienProtocol, “idol white paper.” https://lien.finance/pdf/iDOLWP_v1.pdf,
April 2020. [Accessed: 28-April-2020].
[47] R. Tiutiun, L. Porco, M. Gord, and D. S. Lee, “Usdx: A decentralized monetary policy
system,” 2018.
[48] N. Al-Naji, J. Chen, and L. Diao, “Basis: a price-stable cryptocurrency with an algo-
rithmic central bank,” Formerly known as: Basecoin Version 0.99, vol. 7, 2017.
[49] G. Hileman and M. Rauchs, “2017 global blockchain benchmarking study,” 2017.
[50] OECD, “Oecd blockchain primer.” https://www.oecd.org/finance/OECD-
Blockchain-Primer.pdf, 2018. [Accessed: 10-May-2020].
[51] S. Raval, Decentralized applications: harnessing Bitcoin’s blockchain technology. ”
O’Reilly Media, Inc.”, 2016.
[52] K. Saito and M. Iwamura, “How to make a digital currency on a blockchain stable,”
Future Generation Computer Systems, vol. 100, pp. 58–69, 2019.
[53] M. Iwamura, Y. Kitamura, T. Matsumoto, and K. Saito, “Can we stabilize the price of
a cryptocurrency?: Understanding the design of bitcoin and its potential to compete
with central bank money,” tech. rep., Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi
University, 2014.
[54] F. Saleh, “Volatility and welfare in a crypto economy,” Available at SSRN 3235467,
2019.
[55] P. A. Diamond, “National debt in a neoclassical growth model,” The American Eco-
nomic Review, vol. 55, no. 5, pp. 1126–1150, 1965.
[56] I. Stewart, “Proof of burn - a potential alternative to proof of work and proof
of stake.” https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=131139.0%202, 2012.
[Accessed: 7-May-2019].
[57] I. Georgoula, D. Pournarakis, C. Bilanakos, D. Sotiropoulos, and G. M. Giaglis, “Us-
ing time-series and sentiment analysis to detect the determinants of bitcoin prices,”
Available at SSRN 2607167, 2015.
[58] L. Kristoufek, “What are the main drivers of the bitcoin price? evidence from wavelet
coherence analysis,” PloS one, vol. 10, no. 4, 2015.
[59] T. Vidal, “Hash rate and bitcoin price during mining events: Are they related?.”
https://cointelegraph.com/news/hash-rate-and-bitcoin-price-
during-mining-events-are-they-related, May 2020. [Accessed: 10-May-
2020].
[60] S. Voshmgir, Token Economy: How Blockchains and Smart Contracts Revolutionize
the Economy. BlockchainHub, 2019.
Copyright c© by IIAI. Unauthorized reproduction of this article is prohibited.
IIAI Journal LATEX Template 63
[61] F. M. Ametrano, “Hayek money: The cryptocurrency price stability solution,” Avail-
able at SSRN 2425270, 2016.
[62] M. Morini, “Inv/sav wallets and the role of financial intermediaries in a digital cur-
rency,” Available at SSRN 2458890, 2014.
[63] R. Sams, “A note on cryptocurrency stabilisation: Seigniorage shares,” Brave New
Coin, pp. 1–8, 2015.
[64] F. A. Hayek, Denationalisation of money: the argument refined: an analysis of the
theory and practice of concurrent currencies, vol. 70. Coronet Books Incorporated,
1990.
[65] Q. Wang, “Twitter.” https://twitter.com/QWQiao/status/
998213027097989120, May 2018. [Accessed: 14-May-2020].
[66] N. Al-Naji, “Basis.io.” https://www.basis.io/, December 2018. [Accessed: 14-
May-2020].
[67] E. Kereiakes, M. D. M. Do Kwon, and N. Platias, “Terra money: Stability and adop-
tion,” 2019.
Copyright c© by IIAI. Unauthorized reproduction of this article is prohibited.
